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Abstract 
Microsoft’s claim that it had an objective justification for its refusal to supply interoperability information 
covered by intellectual property rights was dismissed by the EU Commission. To substantiate this, the 
Commission applied a newly framed incentives balance test and concluded that the need to protect Microsoft’s 
incentives to innovate, under the specific circumstances of the case, could not objectively justify the 
undertaking’s refusal to license. On the contrary, Microsoft’s incentives to innovate were most likely to increase 
if it were required to license its interoperability information to competitors. This new balancing test is very 
controversial, both from the economic and legal perspective. It can also be questioned whether the balancing test 
to justification has been correctly applied in the case at issue. However, the paper purports to show that, for 
future discussion under the  expected policy debate on a more “economics-based” approach to Article 82 of the 
EU Treaty, valuable insights can be gained from a careful scrutiny of the incentives balance test. In particular, 
the test helps realizing that a dynamic competition approach on the abuse of dominant position should devote 
considerable efforts to better understand the working of innovation processes at different industry layers. 
Moreover, that at least equally challenging is the identification of the appropriate competition remedies in 
industries characterized by, on the one side, Schumpeterian modes of innovation, and, on the other, strenuous 
stasis forces like network effects. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
The next1 step in the modernisation process of EU competition law that started almost a 
decade ago will possibly imply a revision of the Commission’s policy on the abuse of a  
dominant position under Article 82 of the EC Treaty. In a way similar to the reform of Article 
81 and merger control policy, this policy reorientation will most likely support a more 
“economics-based” approach to the abuse of dominant position.2 Amongst the issues that are 
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1
 Currently under discussion is a refined economic approach to State Aid, see the State Aid Action Plan, under 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/state_aid/others/action_plan/saap_en.pdf. 
2
 In these terms is the suggestion put forth by the Economic Advisory Group for Competition Policy (EAGCP) in 
a report commissioned by the Chief Economist of EU Commission’s DG Competition, to be visioned at 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/publications/studies/eagcp_july_21_05.pdf.  This view is supported by a 
number of commentators, see e.g. B.Sher, The Last of the Steam Powered Trains – Modernising Article 82, (5) 
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possibly going to attract considerable attention under the expected policy debate is the 
doctrine on the unilateral refusal to license intellectual property rights.3 Under EC competition 
law, a refusal to license by a dominant undertaking does not amount as such to abusive 
behaviour. However, the refusal to grant a licence by an undertaking dominating a given 
market can be  abusive under Article 82 if additional elements are stated.4 An early source of 
judicial authority for the identification of those elements is the judgement of  the European 
Court of Justice in Radio Telefis Eireann (RTE) and Independent Televion Publications Ltd 
(ITP) v Commission5, more commonly known as Magill, followed by other relevant 
pronouncements6, last of which is IMS-Health.7     
A substantial issue in the EU Microsoft case8 also originated at the intersection between 
competition and intellectual property law. According to the Commission, Microsoft infringed 
Article 82 by refusing to disclose interface information, notwithstanding the various 
intellectual property rights Microsoft claimed on it.9 For our purposes, the reasoning of the 
Commission on the objective justification for the refusal to release this information is 
particularly noteworthy. In the Commission’s opinion, the need to protect one’s intellectual 
property was not as such a justification for the denial to supply information covered by it. In 
order to be objectively justified, the refusal to disclose information protected by intellectual 
property rights should pass a sort of incentives balancing test. The undertaking’s denial to 
supply cannot claim to be objectively justified under Article 82 if the negative impact of a 
compulsory licence on the dominant firm's incentives to innovate are outweighed by its 
positive impact on the innovation level in the entire industry.10 After examination of the 
circumstances of the case, the Commission concluded that there was a serious risk that 
Microsoft would have succeeded in eliminating all effective competition in the work group 
server operating system market and that this would have produced “a significant negative 
effect on its incentives to innovate as regards its client PC and work group server operating 
system products.”11 Therefore, on balance, the possible negative impact of the order to supply 
                                                                                                                                                        
ECLR, p. 243 et seq.; J.Vickers, Abuse of Market Power, 115(504) Economic Journal (2005), at 244 et seq. Draft 
guidelines on the application of Article 82 should be released by the end of 2005.  
3
 The unilateral refusal to license falls under the more general category of “refusal to supply”, comprising refusal 
by the dominant undertaking  to supply tangible and intangible assets, as well as to provide access to physical 
infrastructure. 
4
 Case 238/87, AB Volvo v Erik Veng [1988] ECR 6211. 
5
 Joined cases C-241/91 P and 242/91 P [1995] ECR I-743. The European Cort of Justice made first explicit in 
Magill some “exceptional circumstances” in which a refusal to license may be an abuse pursuant to Article 82 
EC. First, the intellectual property at issue was indispensable for the production of a new type of product for 
which there was a  demonstrable and unsatisfied consumer demand; second, the intellectual property owner, by 
his refusal, was eliminating all competition on a secondary market; and, third, there was no objective 
justification for the refusal (paras. 54-56). 
6
 Case T-504/93, Tierce Ladbroke v Commission [1997] ECR II-923, Case C7/97, Oscar Bronner v Mediaprint 
[1999] ECR I-2981.  
7
 Case C-418/01, IMS Health GmbH & Co. OHG v NDC Health GmbH &Co. KG. [2004] ECR I-5039. 
8
 COMP/C-3/37.792.  
9
 Id. para. 546.  
10
 Id. para. 783 
11
 Id. para 725 
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information on Microsoft’s incentives to innovate was outweighed by its positive impact on 
the level of innovation of the whole industry.  
If upheld by the European Courts12, the incentives balance test for the objective legitimacy of 
a denial to grant a licence could possibly stand for the most notable contribution of the 
Microsoft case to the refusal to license doctrine in EU competition law. Especially in light of 
the expected policy reform of Article 82, the question arises whether this test is conceptually 
appropriate, economically founded, and capable of providing an administrable legal tool. 
Manifestly, the newly introduced test is highly controversial, both from the economic and 
legal perspective.13 It is also questionable whether the balancing test to justification has been 
correctly applied in the Microsoft case itself.14 Despite the ultimate dismissal of this test, 
either by the judiciary and/or on theoretical and practical grounds, this paper purports to show 
that valuable topics and insights for future discussion under the approaching policy debate can 
be gained from its careful examination. As a starting point this paper revises the incentives 
balance test as framed in the Microsoft decision (Section 2); in the following it deals with 
some relevant issues pertaining to the working of innovation processes this test touches on 
(Sections 3, 4 and 5). Section 6 concludes by summing up some open questions from the 
viewpoint of a pro-innovation competition policy. 
 
2. The Objective Justification for Refusal to License in Microsoft Europe 
According to the EU Commission, Microsoft infringed Article 8215 by refusing to disclose 
information relative to “specifications for the protocols used by Windows work group servers 
in order to provide file, print, group and user administration services to Windows work group 
networks”.16 Microsoft’s strategy allegedly consisted in preserving privileged connections 
between its client PC operating system and its work group servers, in order to retain a 
comparative advantage over rivals employing a different technology with respect to client-to-
                                                 
12
 The Commission’s decision is currently under judicial revision. The President of the Court of First Instance in 
his order on the interim measures found that it was for  the Court dealing with the substance of the case to decide 
if “a manifest error was made in the evaluation of the interests involved, in particular in connection with the 
protection of the intellectual property rights relied on and the requirements of free competition enshrined in the 
EC Treaty”, Case T-201/04 R, at para. 224. 
13
 See G.Badal, M.J.Lawrence, From Magill to Microsoft: Is the European Union’s Insistence on Compulsory 
Licensing of Intellectual Property Rights a Threat to Innovation, American Bar Association, Intellectual 
Property Committee, Fall 2004, 42, at 51 et seq. ; F.Lévêque, Innovation, Leveraging and Essential Facilities: 
Interoperability Licensing in the EU Microsoft Case, 28 W.Comp (2005), 71; D.Gerardin, Limiting the Scope of 
Article 82 of the EC Treaty: What can the EU learn from the U.S. Supreme Court’s Judgment in Trinko in the 
wake of Microsoft, IMS, and Deutshe Telekom?, in CMLR (2004), 1519; D. Ridyard, Compulsory Access under 
EC Competition Law – A New Doctrine of “Convenient Facilities” and the Case for Price Regulation”, 
European Competition Law Review (2004), 669. 
14
 Lévêque, as note 13 above, at 79: “The simplification made by the Commission to facilitate the demonstration 
of the incentives test is not robust. It is not therefore certain that Microsoft passes the new test of incentives 
balance”. See also infra, Sections 4 and 5.  
15
 The other way in which  Microsoft had committed an abuse of a dominant position was by tying of Windows 
Media Player with the Windows operating system.  
16
 Microsoft, as note  8 above, para. 546. 
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server and server-to-server17 interoperability. Such privileged connections are related to the 
main tasks normally performed by work group servers, such as group and user administration 
services (e.g. directory services, security and authentication services, etc.) and file and print 
services. Since both server-to server and client-to-server interoperability are key ingredients 
for the successful marketing of a server system, the advantages  of Microsoft’s products on 
the downstream market were not only due to objective superiority on the merits, but to a great 
extent they depended on the feeble interoperability.18 The Commission considered this an 
unfair handicap that, over time, would have eliminated competition on the work group server 
market in favour of Microsoft’s products. By way of  remedy, the Commission required 
Microsoft to divulge all necessary interface information to allow non-Microsoft  workgroup 
server operating system to achieve full interoperability with Windows PCs and Microsoft 
workgroup servers. To the extent that the interface information at issue covered intellectual 
property rights, Microsoft was required to conclude licences on reasonable and non 
discriminatory conditions. 
A main issue in the Microsoft case therefore pertains to the refusal to supply interoperability 
information to one’s competitors. As long as the relevant information is covered by copyright, 
patents and other forms of intellectual property, Microsoft’a abuse more precisely consists in 
the refusal to license it. As it is well known, under EU competition law a dominant 
undertaking is not under a general duty to assist its competitors. However, under certain 
circumstances, an assistance denial by a dominant firm can be considered illegal. This is in 
particular the case when the dominant firm, by its refusal to supply, seeks to eliminate 
competition by foreclosing rivals.  Perhaps unsurprisingly, the actual identification of the 
“exceptional” circumstances in which a refusal to supply should be considered abusive has 
aroused much controversy, and even more so when intellectual property rights are involved.19 
From the body of EU case law emerges at times the temptation to cut this difficult knot by 
circumscribing  once and for all the relevant circumstances which should be sought for in 
actual cases (“exhaustive” checklist of exceptional circumstances).20 More appropriately, the 
relevant legal and economic test should provide both for general filters and and a certain 
degree of  flexibility.21 This, it seems, is also the way by which the Commission has framed 
its competitive assessment of Microsoft’s unilateral refusal to supply. Accordingly, the EU 
competition authority applies an “entirety of the circumstances” test by which infringement 
                                                 
17
 The server-to-server interoperability is important whenever networks rest on more than one server.  
18
 Microsoft, as note  8 above, para. 1064. 
19
 The call for a stricter legal test when intellectual property rights are involved has been formulated on various 
grounds, see C.Humpe and C.Ritter, Refusal to Deal, Global Competition Law Centre Research Papers on 
Article 82 EC – July 2005, at 142 et seq.,  for a comprehensive summary of the more relevant arguments and 
their careful refutal. 
20
 A (mostly critical) reading of the IMS Health judgement (as note 7 above) along these lines has been 
suggested in a number of comments, see e.g. A.Heinemann, Compulsory Licences and Product Integration in 
European Competition Law – Assessment of the European Commission’s Microsoft Decision, International 
Review of Intellectual property and Competition Law – IIC (2005), 63, at 70 et seq.   
21
 How much flexibility a competition rule should optimally allow for (from an economic perspective) has 
recently become a much debated issue in the law and economics literature, see e.g. D.S.Evans and A.J.Padilla, 
Excessive Prices: Using Economics to Define Administrable Legal Rules, in 1(1) Competition Policy 
International (2005), 133 et seq. 
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must be based on the results of a comprehensive investigation and not be bound by an 
exhaustive checklist of exceptional circumstances.22  
Of particular interest here are those parts of the decision in which the Commission deals at 
length with Microsoft’s central claim that the refusal to disclose the requested information 
was justified given its need to protect valuable intellectual property rights. Despite its ubiquity 
in EU case law on refusal to supply, the requirement of no objective reasons has so far 
attracted little attention23 and appears under-developed if compared to the other recurring 
elements of the legal test at issue.24  On other occasions the Court of Justice had established 
that the mere ownership of an intellectual property right would not as such offer a defence of 
justification for a refusal to license.25 However, Microsoft is not merely asserting the 
exclusive rights to its intellectual property, but points to the circumstance that the requested 
interoperability information is the result of significant research and development efforts.26 
The disclosure would prejudice the protection of the outcome of Microsoft’s investments in 
software features, functions and technologies. In other words, Microsoft  argues that it was 
justified in refusing to supply on the grounds that it would eliminate its incentives to 
innovate.27  
In order to dismiss Microsoft’s claim of objectively justified refusal to supply, the 
Commission applies a newly framed  incentives trade-off test. The balancing exercise at issue 
requires, first, that the negative impact of the  order to supply on Microsoft’s incentives to 
innovate  is assessed and, second, that the possible negative effect is weighted off against the 
positive impact of the order to supply on the entire industry. Only when the positive effects on 
innovation following on disclosure cannot outweigh the negative impact on the dominant 
undertaking’s incentives to innovate, Microsoft’s refusal to supply should be considered 
justified. 
As to the first step of the incentives balancing test, the effects of the obligation to disclosure 
on Microsoft’s incentives to innovate should be assessed “in comparison to the alternative 
situation where Microsoft’s anti-competitive behaviour remains unfettered”.28 In the latter 
case, there would be “a serious risk that Microsoft will succeed in eliminating all effective 
                                                 
22
 Microsoft, as note 8 above, at para. 555 et seq. 
23
 This, however, could be rapidly changing, see for instance P.-J. Loewenthal, The Defence of “Objective 
Justification” in the Application of Article 82 EC, World Competition (2005), 455 et seq. 
24
 Some objective reasons for refusal to supply are indicated in the Notice on the application of the competition 
rules to access agreements in the telecommunications sector, OJ 1998 C 265/2, at para. 91, but their general 
application on other competition issues could be a matter for discussion.  
25
 See e.g. Magill, as note 5 above, para. 55. A similar argument (“If intellectual property rights have been 
lawfully acquired, their subsequent exercise cannot give rise to antitrust liability”) was put forth by  Microsoft in 
the US antitrust case brought against its licensing practices in relation to Windows 98 and web browsers, see 
United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001). The Federal Circuit found that the alleged 
argument  bordered upon the frivolous (“The company claims an absolute and unfettered right to use its 
intellectual property as it wishes: That is no more correct than the proposition that use of one's personal property, 
such as a baseball bat, cannot give rise to tort liability .... Intellectual property rights do not confer a privilege to 
violate the antitrust laws.", at 63).  
26
 This, for instance, could be an element differentiating Microsoft from Magill since in the latter decision a 
“research and development” claim could not have been so easily substantiated.  
27
 Microsoft, as note 8 above,  para. 709. 
28
 Id para. 724, italics in original. 
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competition in the work group server operating system market” and this would have “a 
significant negative effect on its incentives to innovate as regards its client PC and work 
group server operating system products”.29 Put differently, incentives to innovate are much 
likely to vanish if competition is eliminated in the downstream market than if the obligation to 
disclosure is sustained, because Microsoft would have very little incentive to innovate on that 
market. Instead, following on from the disclosure obligation, Microsoft’s work group server 
operating system would have to compete with products fully interoperable with the Windows 
domain architecture and offering new or added functionality.30 Microsoft would no longer 
benefit from a lock-in effect driving consumers towards a homogeneous Microsoft solution, 
and such competitive pressure would increase Microsoft’s own incentives to innovate. 
Furthermore, because of increased competition on the downstream market, Microsoft would 
probably feel more competitive pressure also on the upstream market. As the Commission 
puts it, “Microsoft’s research and development efforts are indeed spurred by the innovative 
steps its competitors take in the work group server operating system market. Were such 
competitors to disappear, this would diminish Microsoft’s incentives to innovate”.31  
Moreover, the Commission takes into consideration the incentives to improve the protocols 
and by that the co-ordination of complementary products (work group server with client-PC). 
Even though Microsoft had anticipated the disclosure order, it would not have invested less in 
trying to achieve the best possible interoperability between its client and server software, 
because “the value of Microsoft’s client PC operating system in the eyes of customer (and 
their willingness to pay) increases through the availability of complementary interoperable 
work group server operating systems”.32   
To sum up, according to the Commission Microsoft’s incentives to innovate would be 
strongly reduced if Microsoft were entitled to continue refusing to supply the requested 
interoperability information.  The latter view also implies that a formal trade-off between 
positive (for the industry) and negative (for the dominant undertaking) incentives  on 
innovation becomes unnecessary. Therefore, in the Microsoft decision the incentives 
balancing test stops at its first step, without need for further inquiry.33 A possible way for 
Microsoft to show that it has an objective justification for its behaviour could be by 
demonstrating that its innovation incentives would be negatively affected and the overall level 
of competition in the industry would not be significantly reduced. Conversely, as soon as the 
negative effects on competition become substantial, Microsoft’ s incentives to innovate begin 
to weaken and are bound to disappear once competition on the market is eliminated. In a 
nutshell, because of the likely elimination of competition on the downstream market 
                                                 
29
 Id. para. 725. 
30
 Without the interoperability information Microsoft’s competitors were not capable of capturing the benefits of 
their innovation in workgroup server operating systems because compatibility with Windows was the product 
characteristic users valued most.  
31
 Id. para. 725. 
32
 Id. para. 726-727. 
33
 See also Lévêque, as note 14 above, at 79: “The demonstration [that the increase in industry incentives is not 
offset by the decrease in the dominant undertaking’s incentives, S.V.] is obviously simplified where compulsory 
licensing does not diminish firm A’s [the dominant undertaking’s, S.V.] incentives”. 
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following the refusal to supply, Microsoft cannot claim that the justification of its behaviour 
lies in the need to safeguard its incentives to innovate.  
Put in these terms, the result of the incentives balancing test and therefore the holding of an 
objective justification to supply would ultimately depend on how competition on the 
downward market affects the dominant undertaking’s incentives to innovate. If the 
elimination of downstream competition does not affect the dominant undertaking’s need to 
innovate, this undertaking could (still) claim that the refusal to supply is justified by the need 
to safeguard its incentives to do so. Conversely, a “research and development incentives” 
defence would hardly  be sustainable if the refusal to supply had the effect to restrict 
competition on the downstream market and thereby to substantially limit the dominant 
undertaking’s incentives to innovate. 
 
3. A Feaseble and Useful Test? 
At first glance, the newly introduced incentives balancing test has the merit to touch on the 
core of the controversial debate at the intersection between intellectual property and 
competition law. If, according to economic theory intellectual property rights are foreseen as 
incentives in order to spur innovation, they should hardly be sustainable whenever it can be 
proved that they actually induce the opposite effect of hindering innovation. Indeed, in the last 
decade economic thinking has moved quite a long way from its early almost deferential 
attitude vis-a-vis intellectual property rights. A considerable amount of research efforts have 
been devoted to understanding when exclusive rights to intellectual property may be expected 
to foster innovation and when the opposite case is more likely. Thus, for instance, it has been 
suggested that a regime strongly supporting the exclusive rights of inventors could induce 
undertakings to protect with patents also unused technologies and by that hinder the 
exploration of specific technological trajectories by competitors.34 Moreover, the increased 
costs of litigation because of the proliferation of intellectual property protection could 
negatively effect incentives to innovate, especially by small firms.35 Finally, when 
innovations are complementary, it could be proved that intellectual property rights often 
constitute a deterrent for investment in innovation.36  The Microsoft case can help elucidate 
the latter point.  A complementary relationship exists between interoperability information 
and workgroup server software, so that it could be affirmed that if undertakings cannot get 
                                                 
34
 W.M.Cohen, R.R.Nelson, J.P.Walsh, Protecting Their Intellectual Assets: Appropriability Conditions and 
Why U.S. Manufacturing Firms Patent (or Not), National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No. 
7552. (2000). 
35
 For empirical evidence supporting this conclusion see J.O. Lanjouw and J.Lerner, Tilting the Table? The 
Predatory Use of Preliminary Injunctions, in 44(2) Journal of Law and Economics (2001), 573 and J.O. 
Lanjouw and M. Schankerman, An Empirical Analysis of the Enforcement of Patent Rights in the United States, 
in Cohen W. and Merrill S. (eds.), Patents in the Knowledge-Based Economy (2003), National Academy Press: 
Washington, D.C. 
36
 Heller M., Eisenberg R., Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, Science 
280, 5364 (1998), 698 et seq. For empirical evidence suggesting that this so-called “anti-commons” problem 
may be less serious than predicted see W.M.Cohen, A.Arora, J.P. Walsh, Effects of research tool patenting and 
licensing on biomedical innovation, in Merrill. and Cohen, as note 35 above. 
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access to innovation 1 (interoperability information), they cannot make innovation 2 
(advanced features of workgroup server software). 37 Put differently, because of the exclusive 
rights on interoperability information, firms on the work group server software market are 
refrained from investing in the innovation of the product’s characteristics.     
Under this light, the Microsoft incentives balance test would seem to be in line with the most 
recent economic thinking on intellectual property rights. The Commission’s newly introduced 
test for the objective justification of a refusal to license could move our attention to 
identifying the special circumstances in which intellectual property rights do not fulfil the 
function for which they are granted. Because of its exclusive focus on innovation incentives, 
the newly introduced test is also notably different from other balancing exercises previously 
suggested in similar contexts. For example, the D.C. Circuit in the U.S. Microsoft  en banc 
decision affirmed in obiter dicta that a monopolization claim could be sustained if “the 
anticompetitive harm of the conduct outweighs the procompetitive benefit”.38 Indeed, from a 
pure ex post perspective, refusal to deal could constrain consumer choice, lower input, raise 
prices, and thereby producing allocative inefficiency. According to this test, competition 
authorities and tribunals should therefore be required to engage in a social welfare calculus 
whether the social value of the improvement (a “better” product) offsets the inefficiency 
produced by the loss of competition (short term – static-  harm to consumers balanced against 
the expected long term – dynamic - benefits to consumers). This turns to a test by which the 
refusal to supply should be condemned when by doing so social welfare is enhanced. The 
above mentioned social welfare calculus is however very controversial, and its feasibility “in 
any predictable or useful way” has been seriously questioned.39  
Notwithstanding the possible support of the incentives trade-off test from the more recent 
economic theories on intellectual property and its qualitative difference from other balancing 
exercises, in the following it is submitted that the Microsoft legal test for the objective 
justification of refusal to license raises some major difficulties especially40 when considered 
against the background of our still limited, albeit growing knowledge41 about the working of 
innovation processes. 
 
4. More innovation on the work group server software market ? 
It has become increasingly apparent that innovation can come from very unlikely sources and 
that the incentive mechanisms spurring it may be significantly different from traditional 
property rights. The open source software42 movement gives an intriguing example of an 
alternative way to organise innovation. There we have individuals developing and exchanging 
                                                 
37
 Lévêque, as note 14 above, at 78 et seq. See also Microsoft, as note 8 above, at para. 695. 
38
 United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 55 (C.A.D.C. Cir. 2001).  
39
  See Humpe and Ritter, as note 19 above, at 149;  and E.Elhauge, Defining Better Monopolization Standards, 
in 56 Stanford Law Review (2003), 253, at 319. See also Loewenthal, as note 23 above, at 470.  
40
 For other critical comments see the studies cited in note 13 above. 
41
 Reference is particularly made to the fast developing research area on the economics of innovation. 
42
 A software product is said to be “open source” when its source code is made freely available to the customer, 
who may copy, modify and distribute it under certain conditions. 
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software without any apparent gain in terms of direct monetary reward. A considerable 
amount of research efforts have been recently devoted to understand the individuals’ 
(programmers’) motivations43, the way open source projects are organized44 and the 
competitive dynamics between proprietary (closed) and open software development 
systems.45 Moreover, it is observed that firms now play an important role in the development 
of open source, possibly holding motivations to some extent different from those of 
individuals.46  The open source software  movement has attracted attention also in the context 
of the Microsoft decision.47 Work group operating system products based on an open source 
code detained a large share of the market, which however started decreasing when Microsoft 
made its appearance with its category of concurring products.   
In this respect, it is not at all clear whether by mandating access to interoperability 
information, innovation on the work group server market will increase in any substantial way. 
In fact, it is not easy to predict what the likely impact of compulsory licensing on the 
innovation incentives is going to be. According to the Commission, thanks to mandated 
access to interoperability information  work group software producers should be expected to 
invest more in the innovation of their products.48 The reasoning seems plausible if it is 
considered that those producers, due to non-disclosure, could not capture the benefits of their 
innovations.49  However, there are two main difficulties with this argument. The first one is 
that it is not disputed that considerable investments in group work server software were made 
also before the disclosure order was issued; second, that the traditional reward appropriability 
by way of exclusive rights on product innovations is not what motivates some of Microsoft’s 
most fierce competitors on the work group operating system market.50   
Possibly, resources that Microsoft’s competitors on the downstream market previously 
devoted to reverse engineering51 will now be employed for the development of new product 
characteristics, thus fostering innovation. This reasoning should however be careful to avoid 
the (still common) fallacy of considering the innovation performance of a specific firm as the 
                                                 
43
 See e.g. E. von Hippel, Democratizing innovation, MIT Press, 2005; C.Baldwin & K.Clark, The architecture 
of cooperation : Does code architecture mitigate free riding in the open source development model ?, Harvard 
Business School Working Paper Series (2004). For a survey see M.A. Rossi, Decoding the “Free/Open Source 
(F/OSS) software puzzle” a survey of theoretical and empirical contributions. Working paper n. 424, Siena 
University. 
44
 See e.g. K.Edwards, An economic perspective on software licences-open source, maintainers and user-
developers, 22 Telematics and Informatics  (2005), 111. 
45
 The question this part of the literature focuses on is whether the open source software movement (assuming 
that programming is accomplished by volunteer programmers) can ultimately defeat Microsoft in the 
marketplace, see for a formal economic model P. Ghemawat and R.Casadesus-Masanell, Dynamic Mixed 
Duopoly: A Model Motivated by Linux vs. Windows, Harvard Business School, Working Paper No. 04–012. 
46
 A.Bonaccorsi, and C. Rossi, Altruistic individuals, selfish firms? The structure of motivation in Open Source 
software, 9(1) First Monday, 2004. 
47
 Microsoft, as note 8 above, especially at paras. 26-29; 101-106; 293-297. 
48
 Microsoft, as note 8 above, para. 695;  
49
 Lévêque, as note 14 above, at 78. See also note 30 above. 
50
 If those competitors had adopted a business model based on proprietary software, however, more incentives to 
produce innovation because of access to interoperability could have been possibly expected. 
51
 See Microsoft, as note 8 above, paras. 292 for a detailed examination of those efforts. 
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direct result of its expenses in research and development.52 As more recent studies on the 
economics of innovation have shown, innovation is a much more complex phenomenon, 
involving inter alia diversified knowledge bases and specific capacities (e.g. “absorptive 
capacity”) by economic actors, path dependencies of technological developments and 
unpredictable events.53 Moreover, it should be recalled that given the complementarity 
between the products that form a complex system like  a PC, the ability of downstream 
competitors to bring product innovations to market is already heavily restricted. In fact, those 
more relevant changes in group work server software that would require modifications to 
Windows client operation system are very unlikely to be implemented if they stem from 
Microsoft’s competitors, whereas, if the innovation comes from the latter’s own downstream 
arm, the necessary modifications are probably implemented at once.  
It also seems clear that innovation on the work group software market will critically depend 
on the actual conditions of the disclosure obligation. The remedy requires Microsoft to share 
details of the technologies used by its server products to communicate with Windows clients: 
independent software developers should be able to build products that communicate and fully 
interoperate with Windows-based PCs. The information must be comparable to that disclosed 
by Microsoft to its own employees and contractors developing Microsoft’s own work group 
server. However, innovation on software products for work group servers can be expected to 
be much less effective if some important actors, like open source software projects, are 
practically prevented from taking part in the Microsoft’s licensing program.54 
To sum up, on first consideration it appears likely that more competitive innovation can be 
expected on the work group server software market thanks to the disclosure obligation. It is 
submitted, however, that the innovation dynamics on the work group server market and the 
actual conditions of the disclosure licensing program should have deserved a more careful 
analysis before the remedy phase of the case. Admittedly, in view of our still limited 
knowledge about the nature and the working of innovation processes, a readily formulated 
answer to this question should not be expected.  
 
5. More innovation in the entire industry?  
Interestingly, competition policy interventions are often scarcely effective in the PC 
industry.55  Economic studies have shown that this particular economic sector tends to have 
                                                 
52
 This problem goes all of the way back to the “incentives based” innovation studies, see A.Pyka, Der kollektive 
Innovationsprozeß, Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1999, at 83. 
53
 In the last twenty years the literature on the economics of innovation has been developing at rapid pace. For an 
introduction see e.g. G.Dosi, , C.Freeman, , R.Nelson, , G.Silverberg, and L. G.Soete, (eds.), Technical Change 
and Economic Theory, 1988, London: Pinter; Von Hippel, E., The Sources of Innovation, 1988, New York: 
Oxford University Press.; J. S. Metcalfe, Evolutionary Economics and Creative Destruction, (1998), London: 
Routledge.  
54
 This is matter of acute dispute in the implementation phase of the Microsoft decision, see the Statement issued 
by the Commission on March 18, 2005 and its following press release of June, 6. On this issue , the advice of the 
newly (October, 5) appointed Monitoring Trustee will possibly play a decisive role. 
55
 For a critical assessment of the competition remedies in the U.S. Microsoft case see in particular T.Bresnahan, 
A Remedy that Falls Short of Restoring Competition, in Antitrust (2001), 67 et seq. The U.S. IBM case was 
  
 
11 
both more forces for change (Schumpeterian competition56 or competition for markets) and 
more forces for stasis (e.g. network effects57) at work than other industries.58 It is against the 
background of these peculiar  characteristics that the Commission’s claim of more innovation 
for the entire industry thanks to disclosure of interoperability information should be assessed.  
The Commission supports a view according to which a competitive undertaking is better 
placed to innovate than a monopolist.59 As it is well known, this is still a very controversial 
issue from the economic perspective.60 In this respect, the history of the economic sector at 
issue could become a source of valuable insights.61 Indeed, the argument that innovation is 
best supported and financed by firms with significant monopoly power would seem to find 
little support in industries like the PC. Innovation in Schumpeterian terms has invariably 
come from undertakings challenging the incumbent dominant position.62 But what the history 
of the industry also tells us is that an innovative idea has hardly proved sufficient to enter the 
market and  enable the wave of creative destruction. Because of network effects and other 
stasis forces at work, some  additional conditions had to be fulfilled. In particular, changes in 
complementors63 were necessary to bring in a considerable number of users with 
characteristics that were at least to some extent different from existing users.64 In fact, 
network effects are bound to devalue if new users are attracted to the industry and these users 
have demand characteristics different from existing users. In other words, changes, innovation 
by complementors have lowered entry barriers and created new opportunities for substitute 
products to compete for the market. Insofar, it seems that less control of other layers by the 
incumbent dominant undertaking and more desintegration in the industry would be important 
ingredients in order to foster innovation in the PC industry. Not only, therefore, a 
decentralized industry can be more innovative at each of the layers composing it; a 
decentralized system can also lead to a more extreme form of innovation, namely 
Schumpeterian creative destruction.  
                                                                                                                                                        
hardly more successful, see F.M.Scherer, Technological Innovation and Monopolization, American Antitrust 
Institute Working Paper 05-07 (2005), 47 et seq. 
56
 T.Bresnahan, Creative Destruction in the PC Industry, Paper presented to the Conference on IT Innovation, 
Tokyo, December 2004, available at http://www.iir.hit-u.ac.jp/file/WP05-03bresnahan.pdf  (last checked 
November 2005). 
57
 See S.M. Besen and J.Farrell, Choosing How to Compete: Strategies and Tactics in Standardization, in 8(2) 
Journal of Economic Perspectives (1984), at 117 et seq.  
58
 See P.A.Geroski, Competition in Markets and Competition for Markets, in Journal of Industry, Competition 
and Trade, 151, at 153. Some authors, however, dispute the importance of network effects in the software 
industry, see e.g. R.Schmalensee, Antitrust Issues in Schumpeterian Industries, 90(2) American Economic 
Review, American Economic Association (2000), at 192: “Contrary to the simple network industry models, 
switching costs and lock-in do not appear to be important in the case of software. Major innovations occur 
repeatedly, and category leaders are frequently displaced by better products”. 
59
 See Section 2 above. 
60
 In the context of the Microsoft decision see e.g. Lévêque, as note 14 above, at 79. 
61
 Throughout this part of Section 4, I draw heavily on Bresnahan, Creative Destruction in the PC Industry, as 
note 56 above, at 5 et seq. 
62
 From the beginning of the PC industry in 1975 we have experienced successive ways of creative destruction, 
e.g. IBM PC replacing Apples and CP/M; Microsoft replacing IBM PC.  
63
 E.g., spreadsheet (VisiCalc) and word processing program (WordStar) for the first wave surrounding the 
introduction of the IBM PC. 
64
 For instance, white collar workers in corporations enabling the first wave. 
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A recent occasion for those favourable conditions for Schumpeterian innovation to materialize 
occurred when the Internet became broadly used. An innovative browser (Netscape) attracted 
many new PC users (home, multimedia, communication users) and was followed by a large 
class of new applications. However, as it is well known from the U.S. Microsoft case, the 
wave of creative destruction never started rolling. Microsoft engaged in specific actions with 
the aim of blocking the widespread distribution of the Netscape browser and prevented third-
party complementors from working with Netscape.65   
Certainly, the disclosure obligation of interoperability information, if properly implemented,  
could help reestablishing at least some of the vertical desintegration that characterized the first 
20 years of the  PC industry. As a consequence, the entire industry, Microsoft included, could 
experience a certain degree of increased innovation incentives, however, of course, not 
comparable to those induced by an actual threat of creative destruction. What the history of 
this particular industry could in particular tell us is that, in order to have more serious chances 
of Schumpeterian innovation, other, stricter competition remedies should possibly have been 
envisaged.66  
 
6. Conclusions 
The incentives balance test has been employed by the Commission in order to dismiss 
Microsoft’s claim that the disclosure of interoperability information would have reduced its 
incentives to innovate. The Commission’s reasoning on this point involves at least two logical 
steps. Following from disclosure of interoperability information there would be more 
competition in the industry; thanks to more competition, more (and not less) incentives to 
innovate should be expected. As it stands, this newly framed trade-off is highly controversial 
and there are also serious doubts that, when applied to the circumstances of the case at issue, 
the result could indeed help supporting the Commission’s finding of abusive conduct under 82 
of the EC Treaty on the part of Microsoft.  
In spite of all well-founded criticism, the main aim of this paper was to show that a mindful 
discussion of this test should be on the agenda of the expected policy debate on a more 
“economics-based” approach to Article 82. If nothing else, the implementation of this 
balancing exercise in the context of the Microsoft decision has raised a number of issues that 
should deserve careful examination in the context of a pro-innovation competition policy.  
Thus, it is apparent that we still know comparatively little about the nature and the working of 
innovation processes. In particular, too little efforts have so far been devoted to understanding 
                                                 
65
 As it became clear also in the U.S. Microsoft case, control over interaction information is a very powerful 
market tool and Microsoft does not  hesitate to use it whenever it suits its business objectives. For instance, 
Microsoft used its control of interface information to compler third-party complementors not to work with 
Netscape, see Bresnahan, Creative Destruction in the PC Industry, as note 56 above, at 22. May be, by refusing 
to supply interoperability information to Sun and other competitors, Microsoft not only was trying to reserve to 
itself the work group software market, but was also anticipating future competitive threats of a much larger 
impact on its incumbent super-dominant position. 
66
 The question of the right remedies increasingly profiles itself as one of the most relevant issues for 
competition policy, see  e.g. the Comments of the American Antitrust Institute Working Group on Remedies, as 
recently filed to the Antitrust Modernization Commission (document available at 
http://www.amc.gov/public_studies_fr28902/remedies_pdf/AAI_Remedies.pdf, last checked November, 2005). 
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spontaneous ways of innovation organization, as for instance the open source software 
movement, or to clarifying the mutual influences amongst innovation processes at different 
industry layers. Moreover, the framing of remedies in industries characterized by 
Schumpeterian modes of innovation would seem to require additional thinking. Of course, 
most of the questions briefly summarized above pose significant challenges, and we cannot 
reasonably expect a competition policy podium to be the most suitable context to face them. 
Nevertheless, a pro-innovation “economics-based67” competition policy cannot avoid taking 
into account that much less certainty and hard facts can be expected, at this stage, even from 
the most modern and accurate economic theories and methods than would be advisable for 
rational, predictable and effective competition intervention.68  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
67
 Especially if by “more economic” it is meant an “effects-based” approach employing empirical methods of 
analysis in individual cases.  
68
 For an approach explicitly incorporating uncertainty into competition decision making and remedies, see 
K.Heyer, A World of Uncertainty: Economics and the Globalisation of Antitrust, 72(2) Antitrust Law Journal 
(2005), at 375 et seq. 
